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SUMMARY
Decentralised forest management approaches are ostensibly designed to increase community involvement in forest management, yet have had 
mixed success in practice. We present a comparative study across multiple countries in Eastern Africa of how far decentralised forest policies 
are designed to achieve devolution. We adopt the decentralisation framework developed by Agrawal and Ribot to explore whether, and how, 
devolution is specified in Tanzanian, Kenyan, Ugandan, Malawian and Ethiopian forest policies. We also compare them to the commitments 
of the Rio Declaration. In all five countries, the policies lack at least some of the critical elements required to achieve meaningful devolution, 
such as democratically elected, downwardly accountable local actors and equitable benefit sharing. Calling an approach ‘community’ or ‘par-
ticipatory’, does not mean that it involves all residents: in Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, policies allow a small group of people in the commu-
nity to manage the forest reserve, potentially excluding marginalised groups, and hence limiting devolution. This may lead to elite capture, and 
effective privatisation of forests, enclosing previously de facto common pool resources. Therefore, even without flaws in implementation, these 
decentralisation policies are unlikely to achieve true devolution in the study countries.
Keywords: decentralization policies, devolution, actors, accountability, empowerments
Les stratégies pour la gestion décentralisée des forêts sont-elles élaborées pour parvenir à une 
dévolution totale? Preuves en provenance d’Afrique de l’est
K. MAGESSA, S. WYNNE-JONES et N. HOCKLEY
Les approches vers la gestion forestière décentralisée sont ostensiblement élaborées pour accroître la participation des communautés dans la 
gestion forestière, mais elles n’ont cependant obtenu que des succès mixtes dans la pratique. Nous présentons une étude comparative dans 
de multiples pays d’Afrique de l’est, pour établir jusqu’à quel point les stratégies forestières décentralisées sont élaborées pour parvenir à la 
dévolution. Nous adoptons le cadre de décentralisation développé par Agrawal et Ribot pour explorer si, et comment, la dévolution est spécifiée 
dans les stratégies forestières en Tanzanie, au Kenya, dans l’Ouganda, au Malawi et en Ethiopie. Nous comparons également l’engagement dans 
la déclaration de Rio. Dans les cinq pays, les stratégies démontrent une carence dans au moins quelques-uns des éléments critiques nécessaires 
pour obtenir une dévolution significative, tels que des acteurs locaux démocratiquement élus, responsables vers le bas, ainsi qu’un partage 
équitable des bénéfices. Appeler une approche «communautaire» ou «participative», ne signifie pas qu’elle inclut tous les résidents: au Kenya, 
en Ouganda et en Ethiopie, les stratégies permettent à un petit groupe d’individus de la communauté de gérer la réserve forestière, excluant 
potentiellement les groupes marginalisés, et limitant ainsi la dévolution. Ceci risque de conduire à une capture des élites et en pratique, à une 
privatisation des forêts, enferment des ressources auparavant de facto communes. Il est par conséquent peu probable que ces stratégies de 
décentralisation dans les pays étudiés débouchent sur une dévolution, même si leur mise en application ne présentait aucun défaut. 
¿Están las políticas para la gobernanza forestal descentralizada diseñadas para lograr una 
completa devolución? Evidencia de África oriental
K. MAGESSA, S. WYNNE-JONES y N. HOCKLEY
Los enfoques de gestión forestal descentralizada están diseñados notoriamente para aumentar la participación de la comunidad en la gestión, 
pero en la práctica han tenido un éxito desigual. Se presenta un estudio comparativo entre varios países de África oriental sobre la medida en 
que las políticas forestales descentralizadas están diseñadas para lograr una completa devolución. El estudio adopta el marco de descentral-
ización desarrollado por Agrawal y Ribot para examinar si la devolución aparece incluida específicamente en las políticas forestales de Tanzania, 
Kenia, Uganda, Malawi y Etiopía, y cómo lo hacen. También se comparan con los compromisos de la Declaración de Río. En los cinco países, 
las políticas carecen por lo menos de algunos de los elementos críticos necesarios para lograr una devolución significativa, como la presencia 
de responsables locales elegidos democráticamente que rindan cuentas a quienes los eligen y una distribución equitativa de los beneficios. 
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degree of devolution of forest resources management to local 
people (Agrawal and Ribot 1999, Crook and Manor 1998).
Since the introduction of this bottom-up approach, schol-
ars have documented mixed impacts (e.g., Bekele et al. 2015, 
Bowler et al. 2012, Hamza and Kimwer 2007, Lambrick et al. 
2014, Lund et al. 2018, Ngaga, et al. 2003, Senganimalunje 
et al. 2015). Reviewing a range of previous studies, Egunyu 
and Reed (2015), Lund and Treue (2008), Persson and Prowse, 
(2017) and Vyamana (2009) found that women and the 
poorest people are often excluded from gaining benefits. 
Mustalahti and Lund (2010) found that some district councils 
failed to approve village by-laws on time and hence frustrated 
community efforts to obtain legal title to their forests. 
Chinangwa et al. (2016), García-López, (2019), Lemenih 
and Bekele (2008) and Mogoi et al. (2012), noted that some 
members of committees are appointed by village leaders 
rather than being locally elected by residents, or else lacked 
power to enforce the forest rules. However, Lund and Treue 
(2008) found that transferring rights and powers to local com-
munities resulted in increased efficiency of forest revenue 
collection in Tanzania, and Bekele et al. (2015) found reduced 
conflicts over forest use and management in Ethiopia.
Although it can be difficult to separate limitations in the 
design of policies, from flawed implementation, (flaws in 
design may beget errors in implementation), it is useful to 
explicitly measure how far forest legislation supports decen-
tralisation. Previous studies (e.g. Bruce 1999, Das 2019, 
Lindsay 2004, Lynch 1998, Mollick et al. 2018, Mekonnen 
and Bluffstone 2015, Mustalahti and Lund 2010, Mutune and 
Lund 2016), have considered this, focussing particularly on 
forest acts (legislation). For example Bruce, (1999) compared 
how property rights and organizational forms have been 
deployed to support community forestry in selected countries 
in Africa, Asia and America, and suggested that more com-
plex forms of organization are required to enable greater man-
agement autonomy. Lindsay (2004) detailed how legislation 
typically impedes or supports decentralisation in enhancing 
livelihoods outcomes, and found that decentralisation falls 
short of improving livelihoods due to the limited rights that 
legislation transferred to local communities. Mustalahti and 
Lund (2010), reviewing cases in Tanzania, Mozambique, and 
Laos found that the Forest Act in Tanzania lacks clarity on the 
process by which local communities attain rights, and the 
process of losing rights. Mutune and Lund (2016) examined 
Participatory Forest Management (PFM) in Kenya as it 
unfolds in practice on the ground and concluded that current 
Llamar a un enfoque ‘comunitario’ o ‘participativo’ no significa que involucre a todos los residentes: en Kenia, Uganda y Etiopía, las políticas 
permiten que un pequeño grupo de personas de la comunidad gestione la reserva forestal, lo que potencialmente excluye a los grupos marginados 
y limita por tanto la devolución. Esto puede conducir a la captura de recursos por la élite y a la privatización efectiva de los bosques, haciendo 
inaccesibles lo que antes eran de facto recursos de uso común. Por lo tanto, incluso aunque no haya fallos de implementación, es poco probable 
que estas políticas de descentralización logren una verdadera devolución en los países del estudio.
INTRODUCTION
Before the 1980s, centralised forest policies in many coun-
tries excluded local communities, while often failing to 
prev ent degradation of forest resources (Haller et al. 2008). 
Whilst the concept of community involvement in forest 
management has been developing since the early 1950s, the 
idea gained momentum in the 1980s due to a shift in rural 
development thinking and practice (Barlett and Malla 1992, 
Timsina 2003). Structural adjustment programmes, supported 
by world financial institutions such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) also contributed to the 
popularity of the concept (Kowero et al. 2003, Ribot 2002). 
These financial institutions supported decentralisation as part 
of downsizing central governments and forced African gov-
ernments to introduce decentralisation reforms in all sectors, 
including the forest sector (World Bank 1992). Furthermore, 
in the early 1990s, a number of international frameworks 
emerged demanding local community involvement in forest 
management as an intrinsic component of sustainable forest 
management principles. These include Chapter 11 of Agenda 
21 adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED) the Convention on Biological 
Diversity; the Rio+20 Declaration; the African Timber Orga-
nization, and Sustainable Development Goals (ATO 2003, 
CBD 2003, UN, 1992, 2012, 2015). All of these frameworks 
require forest policies to allow indigenous peoples and local 
communities, including women and the poorest individuals, 
to have rights to participate in forest management and access 
forest resources benefits (ATO 2003, CBD 2003, UN, 1992, 
2012, 2015).
Following this, in the 1990s, forest policies in almost 
all countries in Africa and Asia adopted more decentralised 
approaches as a way to improve forest governance and rural 
livelihoods (Schreckenberg and Luttrell 2009, White and 
Martin 2002). The first literature explicitly referring to forest 
decentralisation approaches was published in 1982 (Sen, 
1982)1. The concept of forest decentralisation has been used 
in numerous articles (e.g. Adam and Eltayeb, 2016 and 
Rondinelli et al. 1989), evolving and taking different forms 
from country to country due to differences in actors and the 
political context in which it is implemented (Odera, 2009). 
Among these forms are Community Forest Management 
(CFM), Collaborative Forest Management (CoFM), Partici-
patory Forest Management (PFM), and Co-management (see 
table 1). Despite the diversity of these terms, all imply some 
1 Search in Web of Science for “community forest manag*” OR “participatory forest manag*” OR ”collaborative forest manag*”OR 
“co-management” AND (forest* OR natural).
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policies appear not to support effective participation, focusing 
mainly on the livelihoods of local communities rather than 
governance per se. In their extensive review of past forest 
policies and current forest developments in Ethiopia, 
Mekonnen and Bluffstone (2015) indicated that although 
Ethiopia is implementing policies for decentralised forest 
governance, all the major forests continue to be owned and 
managed by the Ethiopian government which has limited 
communities’ capacity to enforce rules, resulting in high rates 
of deforestation and forest degradation. Das (2019) and 
Chomba et al. (2015) studying forest decentralisation in 
India and Kenya respectively, highlighted that forest decen-
tralisation policies transferred only limited powers to local 
communities. Alden Wily, (2002) provides a multicountry 
analysis of forest decentralisation policies, but their focus 
was a general review of policies without considering them in 
relation to theories of devolution or the international aspira-
tions upon which policies for decentralised forest governance 
are based.
We build on this previous literature by analysing forest 
decentralisation policies across several countries, considering 
not just legislation, but also policies and guidelines, compar-
ing them to Agrawal and Ribot’s (1999) decentralisation 
framework and the aspirations of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development (shortened here to Rio Decla-
ration). We recognise that documentary review of policies is 
not sufficient to determine likely outcomes. Instead, we aimed 
to evaluate the extent to which devolution to local communi-
ties is specified in Tanzanian, Kenyan, Ugandan, Malawian 
and Ethiopian forest policies, following the decentralisation 
framework developed by Agrawal and Ribot (1999). We argue 
that if policies themselves are not designed to achieve devolu-
tion, it is unlikely that it will happen. Not all policies were 
explicitly attempting to achieve devolution though all clearly 
aimed to increase local control and power in forest manage-
ment. Whatever the intention of specific policies in each 
country, it is useful to measure how far these policies have 
gone towards achieving devolution. Our objective is therefore 
to determine whether policies contained the necessary provi-
sions to achieve devolution and not to consider whether the 
policies are a success on their own terms. 
A number of theories have been used to understand decen-
tralised management of resources, for example participation 
and common pool resource theories by Arnstein (1969) and 
Ostrom, (1990) respectively. Drawing on previous work, 
Agrawal and Ribot’s (1999) framework was developed 
specifically to analyse policies that aimed to decentralise 
forest management, envisaging a form of governance where 
management responsibility is vested in an executive body at 
the community level that is kept to account through proce-
dures of information sharing and election. We adopt this 
framework because of its widespread use in other recent for-
est governance studies, particularly notable in its guidelines 
for democratically elected and downwardly accountable 
local actors, and equitable benefit sharing (see e.g. Das 2019, 
Chinangwa et al. 2016, Chomba et al. 2015, Mutune and 
Lund 2016). Therefore, the Agrawal and Ribot framework is 
well suited to our objectives and the situation observed by 
recent literature in Eastern African countries (e.g. Chinangwa 
et al. 2016, Chomba et al. 2015, Mutune and Lund 2016). 
 TABLE 1 Types of decentralised forest governance considered
Country Name Programmes Type of land /forest/tenure Source
Tanzania Participatory Forest 
Management (PFM)
Village Land Forest 
Reserves (VLFR)
Forests on village land URT, 2007.p.1 and 3; 
URT 2002, s.33.pg 35 
Community Forest 
Reserves (CFR)
Forests on village land URT, 2007.p.1 and 4; 
URT 2002, S.42.pg 46
Joint Forest 
Management (JFM)
Forest reserve managed and owned by 
government (central or local authority) 
URT 2013.p. 1




Unallocated customary land GoM, 2010,p. 48, 2007, 
2001 and 1996
Co-management Government forest reserve GoM, 2010,p.48, 2007, 
2001 and 1996




State forest or local authority forest GoK, 2005




State forest  FDRE 2007,s.3.p.8 











Forest on community land† GoU, 2015
† “Community land” means former public land held by the District Land Board, Land designated as “fragile ecosystem” by NEMA (by way 
of National Environment Status of 1995), Areas to be planted as community managed plantations and Woodland/pastoral areas communally 
used by a community (GoU, 2015, p.2).
86   K. Magessa et al.
Without understanding the powers of different actors in forest 
resource management, the domains in which they exercise 
their powers, and to whom and how they are accountable, it is 
impossible to analyse how far policies for forest decentralisa-
tion have gone towards achieving devolution (Agrawal and 
Ribot 1999). The analysis also considers whether the policies 
meet the aspirations of the Rio Declaration, which has been 
widely adopted, including by all the five study countries, as 
a way to achieve sustainable forest management. Therefore, 
the international framework might be expected to have had 
an influence on the format and development of the different 
country’s policies for decentralised forest governance, and it 
is useful to assess the degree to which they are aligned. 
The countries chosen are all in the UN “eastern Africa” 
statistical region, and all adopted decentralised forest poli-
cies. We aimed to review countries with different histories 
of forest decentralisation. The chosen countries provide some 
variation with regard to decentralisation of forest governance 
and this gives a useful cross section of approaches to evaluate. 
In particular, the models of forest decentralisation implemen-
tation in Tanzania and Malawi differ from those in Kenya, 
Uganda and Ethiopia, as they are based on village jurisdiction 
as opposed to the membership of an association or coopera-
tive (FDRE, 2007.s.4.4.p.11, s.3.p.7, GoK, 2005, p.3, GoM, 
1997. s.25. p. 15, GoU, 2003. p.34, URT, 2002. s.33. p.52). 
In addition, differences in the history of the countries have led 
to variation in some of the factors that are important to forest 
decentralisation, e.g. political and administrative structures 
and land tenure systems (Mustalahti and Lund 2010). Kenya, 
Uganda and Malawi were colonised by the British for around 
six decades. In Tanzania, British rule followed German, 
while Ethiopia was only briefly occupied by Italy. All study 
countries, except Tanzania, were among the first countries in 
Africa to adopt structural adjustment reforms in the 1980s 
that led to wider changes in policies of different sectors 
including forestry, and then later in the 1990s the countries 
adopted policies for decentralised forest governance (Kiiza 
et al. 2007, Kowero et al. 2003). This article contains five 
sections: following this section, the second section outlines 
the theoretical approach and methods; the third section 
presents results, the fourth section presents discussion; and 
the last section provides conclusion and recommendations.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODS
Types of Decentralisation
There are four types of decentralisation recognized in the 
literature (Devolution, Deconcentration, Delegation and 
Privatization) (Ribot 2004). Devolution is the process of 
transferring decision-making powers, tasks and resources 
from high-level authorities (the Central Government) to lower 
level authorities (Ribot 2004). Deconcentration is the process 
of transferring some of the selective administrative functions 
from the high-level authorities to lower level authorities, or 
sub-national units within central government ministries and 
agencies. In this case, the high level authorities are not giving 
up any authority (Ribot 2002, Manor and World Bank 1999). 
Delegation is the transfer of some responsibilities and decision-
making power from high-level authorities to organizations 
that are not in the normal bureaucratic structures and only 
indirectly controlled by the high authorities (Oyono 2007). 
Privatization is another form of decentralisation in which 
the government transfers its responsibilities and services 
onto private enterprises or Non-Governmental Organizations 
(Ribot 2002). All these are types of decentralisation but 
devolution is a more complete form of decentralisation when 
compared to deconcentration and delegation (Agrawal and 
Ribot 1999). Privatisation does not necessarily differ from 
devolution in extent, but rather in to whom powers are given, 
and how they are accountable. The analysis in this article 
primarily focusses on devolution but also notes when the 
policies may have characteristics of deconcentration or dele-
gation. It may be in practice that policies may have features 
of more than one type of decentralisation. Privatisation 
was excluded from the analysis as it was not considered in 
Agrawal and Ribot’s decentralisation framework, however, 
we consider in the discussion whether some policies exhibit 
elements of privatisation.
Forms of forest policy
Governments define and elaborate forest decentralisation 
policies through various means including Acts/Proclamations, 
Ordinances, Policies, Guidelines and Management plans. 
They can be usefully classified based on the type of policy, 
who creates and approves the policy, their purpose and legal 
effect (Table 2). 
Analytical Approach
In this paper, we focus on three critical elements proposed 
by Agrawal and Ribot (1999), namely actors, empowerment 
and accountability (see Figure 1 and Table 3, these are briefly 
explained below). We also compare the policies in question to 
the commitments of the Rio Declaration, which also provided 
principles for the involvement of local community in forest 
management (see Table 3). Several different decentralisation 
programmes may be present in each country (see Table 2), 
and were analysed separately. Attention was paid to policy 
wording, since major policy differences can result from subtle 
differences in wording as to whether rules are voluntary (dis-
cretionary) or mandatory (non-discretionary) (Cashore 1997, 
McDermott et al. 2009). Data for the study were drawn from 
Forest Acts, Policies, and forest decentralisation guidelines in 
each of the study country. 
Actors
The underlying contention of the decentralisation framework 
is that under deconcentration and delegation, power would be 
transferred to appointed local actors or low-level government 
agencies and semi-autonomous organization(s) respectively 
(Agrawal and Ribot 1999). Whilst for full devolution, local 
actors should be elected by, and representative of, all groups 
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within the community (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). Although 
the Rio Declaration is silent on whether members in local 
committee need to be elected, it does require local committee 
to be representative of all groups within the community. 
Empowerment
In this framework, empowerment refers to (1) capacity to 
manage resources; (2) authority to make decisions and rules, 
and then approve and implement these rules; (3) the degree to 
which communities adjacent to forests can decide about the 
use and access of forest resources. In deconcentration, delega-
tion and devolution, members of the forest committee should 
be empowered with skills on forest governance, including 
accounting and record keeping (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). 
However, for decentralised forest governance to achieve full 
devolution, it is also necessary to empower ordinary commu-
nity members with management capacity and for them to 
have access to information relevant to forest management so 
as to enhance their participation and representation in forest 
decision-making (Agrawal and Ribot 1999, Chinangwa et al. 
2016; UN, 1992, p. 270). In addition, the Rio Declaration 
requires policies to develop forest resource dispute-resolution 
arrangements for achieving sustainable forest management 
(UN, 1992, p. 279). 
For decentralised forest governance to achieve deconcen-
tration, delegation and devolution, local communities should 
be empowered with enforcement powers that can be further 
divided into: power to create rules, approve or modify old 
ones, power to implement the rules and to ensure compliance 
with the rules (Agrawal and Ribot 1999, UN, 1992, p. 104). 
The Rio Declaration elaborates further and specifies that 
policies should provide for the active participation of local 
communities in formulation of national policies, laws and 
programmes relating to resource management and other 
development processes that may affect them and for their 
initiation of proposals for such policies and programmes 
(UN, 1992, p. 104). 
For decentralised forest governance to achieve deconcen-
tration, there are no requirements for empowerment of actors 
with decision-making. In delegation, local institutions should 
be empowered with limited decision-making. Furthermore, 
the Rio Declaration is in line with Agrawal and Ribot (1999), 
by stating that local communities need to be actively involved 
in all decision-making processes with special consideration 
of marginalised groups e.g. women and poorest individuals so 
as to achieve devolution and sustainable forest management 
(Agrawal and Ribot 1999, UN, 1992, p. 270). 
For decentralised forest governance to achieve deconcen-
tration or delegation there is no specified need to empower 
committees and ordinary community members with utiliza-
tion rights. In order to achieve devolution, policies need to 
specify clear mechanisms for sharing benefits that will allow 
equality in accessing benefits between all major groups 
(Agrawal and Ribot 1999, Cronkleton et al. 2012 and UN, 
1992, p. 270). “Transferring power without accountable 
representation is dangerous and establishing accountable 
representation without powers is empty” (Ribot 2002, p.1).
Accountability
Accountability is a critical element that allows one to be both 
accounted to, and be held accountable by, others (Oyono 
2004). Appointed local actors or low-level government agen-
cies and semi-autonomous organizations, in deconcentration 
TABLE 2 Forms of forest policy in the study countries
National legislation Local legislation National policy Local policy 
Term use in 
each 
country 
Act in Tanzania, Kenya, 
Uganda, Malawi, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe and 
Proclamation in Ethiopia
Ordinance Policy Guideline† Management plan
Who 
creates 
Executive (govt, usually a 
specific ministry) but is 




Ministry Ministry Village assembly/
Local community at 
village level†
Purpose Provide directive or legal 
framework to implement 
the objectives and goals 
stated in Forest policy
Provide directive or 
legal framework to 
implement the 
objectives and goals 







Set out the 
requirements and 
procedures for 
achieving goals and 
objectives stated in 
forest policy documents
Sets out the 
management approach 
and goals together 





Legally enforced Legally enforced May not be 
legally binding
May not be legally 
binding
May be legally 
enforced
† “Guideline” means PFM guidelines in Kenya and Ethiopia. A Field and Lessons Manual for PFM in Malawi. Guidelines for the Registration, 
Declaration and Management of Community Forests and Guidelines for Implementing Collaborative Forest Management in Uganda. 
Community Based Forest Management Guidelines and Joint Forest Management Guidelines in Tanzania.
† Management plans are also influenced by national policies, and often by local forest officers.
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FIGURE 1 Decentralisation framework adopted from Agrawal and Ribot (1999)
and delegation respectively, should be upwardly accountable 
to central government (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). In devolu-
tion, powers and rights should be devolved to elected mem-
bers of local committee who will be downwardly accountable 
to the local communities and upwardly to government 
(Agrawal and Ribot 1999). Downward accountability is very 
important in devolution since it empowers other individuals 
in the community (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). In addition, 
upward accountability facilitates protection and management 
of public goods, such as watershed protection (Oyono 2004). 
In connection to that, there should be continued involvement 
of state actors to facilitate the implementation of the decen-
tralised forest governance on the ground. These actors should 
also be both upwardly accountable to central government as 
well as downwardly accountable to the local communities 
(Oyono 2004). The Rio Declaration is silent on accountability 
to constituents or government. However, it is in line with 
Agrawal and Ribot’s framework in suggesting participation of 
non-governmental organizations; international and regional 
organizations as a fundamental prerequisite for achieving 
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devolution and sustainable forest management (Agrawal and 
Ribot 1999.p.5 and UN, 1992. p. 104).
In order to understand the nature of accountability, it is 
necessary to make a detailed assessment of how and to whom 
actors are accountable (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). The most 
commonly cited mechanisms used to enforce accountability 
are electoral processes; third party monitoring; auditing and 
evaluations; public reporting and existence of sanctions that 
are enforced (Ackerman 2004). 
RESULTS 
Actors
The local institutions specified in Tanzania’s Village Land 
Forest Reserves and Malawi’s Community Forest policies 
have the potential to achieve full devolution, as the decen-
tralisation policies require members of the Village Natural 
Resource Committees to be duly elected by their constituents 
and representative of all groups in the community (see Table 
3 and appendix 1). However, Tanzanian Community Forest 
Reserves policies only require local institutions to be a group 
of persons desirous of managing a forest reserve: this could 
achieve delegation. Likewise, in Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, 
decentralised forest policies have the potential to achieve 
delegation rather than deconcentration or full devolution, 
since the policies allow committee members to be elected by, 




Policies for decentralised forest governance in all of the study 
countries are deficient in empowering local institutions with 
full management capacity, though to different degrees (see 
Table 3 and appendix 1). All policies except those in Tanzania 
and Malawi explicitly address the need to empower elected 
members of forest committees with strategies to prevent and 
manage forest use conflicts. There is a remarkable similarity 
across all the study countries in the absence of clear national 
commitment to ensuring local community awareness (both 
committee members and ordinary members) of their rights 
over forest management, access and use. 
Decision making powers
Only Tanzanian Village Land Forest Reserves allow for full 
devolution. All other policies empower local actors with only 
limited decision-making over management and utilization of 
the forest resources (see Table 3 and appendix 1). In Tanzania 
(JFM), Malawi, Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, forests are 
managed under a joint agreement between local actors and 
government. Likewise, policies for decentralised forest 
governance in all the study countries (except in Tanzanian 
Village Land Forest Reserves) require forest staff to be 
involved in the implementation of the approach e.g. participa-
tion in decision making with regard to management and 
utilization of forest resources. This may limit the amount of 
power and level of influence that local actors may exercise 
upon approach implementation.
Utilization rights
Utilization rights concern the legal entitlement of all mem-
bers in the community to have equitable access to, and use 
of, the forest resource, income generating activities initiated 
by the decentralisation initiative, financial benefits accrued 
from selling harvested forest products, permit and penalty 
fees. Policies for decentralised forest governance in the study 
countries all go some way towards achieving this but there are 
differences on how actors will be empowered with utilization 
rights (see Table 3 and appendix 1). Only Tanzanian VLFR 
and Ugandan Community Forest are aligned with full devolu-
tion, since the policies empower local communities to use 
100% of the benefits obtained from the programme. There is 
some ambiguity in Malawi about whether the local commu-
nity are able to retain 100% of the benefits in Community 
Forest, because policies for decentralised forest governance 
require forest staff to be involved in the implementation of the 
approach. Under policies for decentralised forest governance 
in Kenya, Ethiopia and all other countries in forests that are 
managed under joint agreement between communities and 
government, the utilization rights are limited to those outlined 
in the Joint Management Agreement. In addition, there is 
an absence of a clear mechanism for sharing forest benefits 
from Joint Forest Management policies in Tanzania, Kenya, 
Uganda and Ethiopia. 
Enforcement powers
Policies in all the study countries are deficient in empowering 
forest committees with enforcement powers (e.g. power to 
create rules, give or withhold final approval, or modify old 
ones, power to implement the rules, and power to take offend-
ers of illegal activities to court), hence may not allow for 
full devolution (see Table 3 and appendix 1). Only VLFR in 
Tanzania empowered Village Natural Resource Committees 
to take offenders of large-scale illegal activities to court. Else-
where, all cases of serious encroachment need to be reported 
to Forestry Departments for assistance, this limits devolution 
and is likely to frustrate local communities. Only VLFR and 
JFM in Tanzania state clear strategies for exclusion of outsid-
ers. Here policies for decentralised forest governance require 
Village Natural Resource Committees to provide a list of the 
rules and punishments to Village Councils of neighbouring 
villages to inform their own people. 
There is a remarkable similarity in the absence of clear 
national commitment in policies for decentralised forest 
governance to empower local actors to have the final say on 
approving forest by-laws. Forest by-laws are required to 
be finally approved by the local authority or the Director of 
Forests, giving them a veto. 
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Accountability
Tanzania’s Village Land Forest Reserves and Joint Forest 
Management (except on Community Forest Reserves) and 
Malawi’s Community Forest and Co-management policies 
may achieve full devolution, because the policies require 
members of Village Natural Resource Committees, or Block 
Committees to be duly elected by their constituents to 
enhance downward accountability. However, the decentrali-
sation policies in Kenya and Uganda have the potential to 
achieve only delegation, or privatization, in this respect since 
Forest Community Association Committees, Community 
Forest Management Committees and Communal Land Asso-
ciation Management Committees are downwardly account-
able only to a small group of people in the community and 
upwardly accountable to the central government. Calling the 
approach community or participatory, does not mean that the 
approach involves all residents, since, in Kenya and Uganda a 
small group of people who are members of Forest Commu-
nity Associations, Forest User Groups or Communal Land 
Associations elect members in the forest committee (see 
Table 3 and appendix 1). In Ethiopia, policies for decentral-
ised forest governance failed to define to whom Forest 
Executive Committees are accountable and how committee 
members assume positions. 
There is similarity in the absence of clear commitment in 
the policies for decentralised forest governance in all the 
study countries on how accountability could be enhanced. 
There is an absence of commitment to clear and transparent 
benefit-sharing mechanisms to ensure equity in case of forests 
that are jointly managed by government and local communi-
ties. There is an absence of clearly defined schedules of 
committee elections in all the study countries. In addition, 
procedures for handling forest finance and public audit 
sessions are fundamental prerequisites for achieving account-
ability yet are lacking in policies for decentralised forest 
governance. Policies for decentralised forest governance 
in all the study countries except in Malawi specifically allow 
for active participation of external partners (e.g. NGOs) in 
decentralisation.
DISCUSSION
The introduction of decentralised forest policies in Tanzania, 
Malawi, Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia signifies a major 
shift away from centralized, state-led management. In these 
countries, policies for decentralised forest governance allow 
establishment of new committees that manage the forest. 
However, the policies in Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia allow a 
non-representative group to establish institutions to manage 
forests, which may led to elite dominance of decision-making 
and capture of benefits, resulting in the exclusion of poorer 
individuals and marginalised groups (Birch et al. 2014 and 
Gurung, et al. 2011). In such situations, forest decentralisa-
tion may end up benefiting outsider groups (Bijaya et al. 
2016). In effect, the outcome of the policy may be a form 
of privatisation, enclosing previously de facto common land, 
and even reducing the power of local residents, relative to 
when forests were nominally controlled by central govern-
ment (Ribot 2004). Decentralised forest policies in Tanzania 
and Malawi require members of the committees to be elected 
by all members of the community, to enhance representation 
and reduce the risk of domination by particular social eco-
nomic strata. Even here, it may be difficult to define who the 
community is that must be represented, and that deserves to 
have a say in the management of the forest. If forest resources 
are of particular importance to certain sectors of the commu-
nity (e.g. landless households, or pastoralists) should they 
have greater influence over its management? Moreover, dem-
ocratic elections are not sufficient to guarantee elimination of 
elite capture in the approach. Local elites are rich and have 
social capital that help them to be elected by constituents. 
Lund and Saito-Jensen, (2013) showed that elite capture of 
institutions is dynamic, and that other sectors of the commu-
nity may learn to navigate the new institutions and achieve 
greater influence over time. However, this process is likely to 
be dependent on residents having basic rights to hold forest 
committees accountable, which are lacking in many of the 
policies we reviewed. It also remains to be seen whether this 
adaptation leads to a genuine reduction in elite capture, or 
simply a redistribution of power between different elites. 
We found that forest decentralisation policies in Kenya, 
Uganda, Ethiopia and Malawi and in Joint Forest Manage-
ment in Tanzania, allow forest staff to take part in manage-
ment activities of decentralised forests, potentially limiting 
the decision making power of local communities. Since the 
government in these forests retains ownership, forest staff’s 
involvement might be expected to safeguard the ownership 
rights and only take a role in decisions that may affect sustain-
ability of the forest reserve, however, it may not be restricted 
to this (Chinangwa et al. 2016 and Kamoto 2007). When 
policies for decentralised forest governance transfer more 
powers to forest committees, there is a need also to have mea-
sures in the policies to ensure sharing of key management 
functions and decision making with all committee members 
and ultimately the community as a whole. Observations in 
Mali indicated that the role of local communities in decision-
making remains unclear in the decentralisation policies, 
raising questions about how the government and local 
communities will work together and who will participate in 
decision-making regarding decentralisation (Becker 2001 and 
Benjaminsen 1997). Bodies of theory upon which decentrali-
sation policies are based highlight that participation without 
redistribution of decision-making powers is an empty and 
frustrating process for the powerless (Arnstein 1969 and 
Ostrom 1990). In addition, we noted that all policies except in 
Malawi explicitly identify the need to empower local actors 
with skills in conflict management, which they may or may 
not have. These are important, because when conflicts in 
forest management are ignored or allowed to escalate, it can 
lead to further deforestation and degradation (Rahman 2003, 
Warner and Jones 1998, Warner 2000). Banana et al. (2005) 
found poor implementation of decentralised forest gover-
nance because local actors had not been empowered to 
resolve forest related conflicts, and if any conflicts occurred 
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during implementation of the approach, elected members 
in forest committees had to request assistance from either 
District Forest Offices or Sub-county level forest guards.
We found that in all the study countries, the enforcement 
powers transferred to local communities were unbalanced, 
in that the decentralised forest policies transferred powers to 
execute forest by-laws without the requisite power to make, 
alter, and finally approve them or to take offenders to local 
courts. Directors or local authorities retained the powers 
to make forest by-laws with regard to forest management, 
utilization and revenue sharing. This can delay the process 
of implementing forest decentralisation, particularly in forest 
areas with valuable natural capital when Directors or local 
authority envisage losing forest revenue generation opportu-
nities (Nathan et al. 2007, Mustalahti and Lund 2010). In 
addition, when policies require the Director of forest to com-
ment on and approve the final forest-bylaws this can cause 
elected committees to copy what the Director has prescribed 
to quickly get approval of the forest by-laws; similar concerns 
have been observed by Chinangwa et al. (2016). This is why 
Agrawal and Ribot, (1999) and Buchy and Hoverman (2000) 
advised that Directors of forest departments and District 
councils should assume an advisory and supervisory role in 
decentralisation, because their active involvement in the 
approach limits local empowerment. Our findings are in line 
with Mutune and Lund, (2016) and Chomba et al. (2015) 
who highlighted that in Kenya, central government retained 
the power to make forest rules, reducing decision-making 
powers and sense of ownership of members of Community 
Forest Associations.
We found that policies for decentralised forest governance 
in all the study countries lack clearly defined terms or sched-
ules for the next election, this may compromise downward 
accountability of the committee members. Although elections 
of committee members of forest management does not seem 
to guarantee accountability (Chomba et al. 2015, Saito-
Jensen et al. 2010), frequent elections with clear timeframes 
and involving all residents entitled to vote does seem a fruitful 
path for enhancing accountability of committee leaders to 
their constituencies. Mandatory record keeping, public audit-
ing and procedures to oust leaders who abuse their public 
mandates would help to establish transparency and account-
ability of committee leaders during implementation of the 
policies. Lack of clearly defined mechanisms in the policies 
for imposing checks and balances within the programme may 
increase the opportunities for actors to undertake corruption 
and patronage when implementing the programme (Barbier 
et al. 2004 and White 2000). Corruption can be worse in 
devolved systems than centralized systems (Adam and 
Eltayeb 2016 and Tacconi 2007).
We found that policies for forest decentralization in 
Malawi lack a commitment to allow participation of NGOs, 
especially at community level. This could enhance elite 
dominance and limit government accountability in terms of 
devolving appropriate rights and powers to local communi-
ties. NGOs who are not connected with the government 
may be in a good position to assist and empower local com-
munities in demanding rights and powers to forest resources. 
However, this depends on their true level of independence. 
In term of reducing elite dominance, NGOs can assist local 
communities in counterbalancing the interests of powerful 
groups in the community with interests in decentralised forest 
governance that can arise during implementation of the 
approach (Mustalahti and Lund 2009). NGOs can create an 
effective alliance among non-elites and other actors as well as 
a space for disadvantaged groups to sufficient exercise their 
power in decision making (Lund and Saito-Jensen 2013, 
Saito-Jensen et al. 2010, Classen et al. 2008). 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
We sought to understand the extent to which decentralisation 
forest policies in the study countries are compatible with 
achieving devolution. In all five countries, policies for decen-
tralised forest governance fail to provide for some critical 
elements such as democratically elected, downwardly 
accountable local actors and equitable benefit sharing that are 
required to achieve meaningful devolution. Decentralisation 
policies in Tanzania and Malawi may have the greatest poten-
tial to achieve devolution, as they require committee members 
to be elected by all residents in the area and be representative 
of all groups in the community, contributing to downward 
accountability as well as helping to prevent elite capture 
(Agrawal and Ribot 1999, Olowu 2003). In all cases, how-
ever, accountability could be better achieved by more clearly 
defining: procedures for handling forest finance, public audit 
sessions and central government oversight of local govern-
ment. Whilst this is not an exhaustive list of the ways to 
achieve accountability, these are important first steps to 
ensure necessary parameters are in place. Decentralisation 
policies in Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia are less aligned with 
devolution because the policies allow members of the forest 
committee to be representative of, and elected by, only a 
group of people in the community who wish to manage the 
forest reserve, potentially excluding marginalised groups. 
This may lead to elite capture, and effective privatisation 
of management, enclosing previously de facto common pool 
resources. In all the study countries, the state has transferred 
to local communities responsibility for enforcing forest 
by-laws but not powers to give or withhold final approval, 
hence compromising their decision-making powers and 
achievement of local empowerment. 
If donors and governments want to devolve real power 
to local communities, they need to reform PFM policies to 
ensure that members of forest committees are locally elected 
and representative of all residents, as well as empower local 
communities with full enforcement powers.
We acknowledge that examining policies is only part of 
the story, and implementation may further exacerbate, or 
compensate for, some of the shortcomings found. However, 
this study shows that the policy frameworks for forest decen-
tralisation in Eastern Africa, are not at present sufficient to 
ensure devolution. 
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 Appendix 1: Results summarised in Table 3 
Actors
S1: Policies for decentralised forest governance in Tanzania 
require local institutions1 at village level in Village Land 
Forest Reserves and Joint Forest Management to be either 
established as Village Natural Resource Committees (VNRC)2 
or the existing committee of the Village Council3. Likewise, 
members of these committees are required to be elected by, 
and representative of, all groups and parts in the community4, 
with special consideration of marginalised groups. E.g. at 
least one third of the Village Natural Resource Committees 
members must be women, likewise people from different sub 
villages must be represented – especially those sub villages 
that are close to the forest area (URT 1998. PS 3.p.27, URT 
2002, s.33.p.52, URT 2007, p.5 and 12, URT 2013, p.4). 
However, in Community Forest Reserves the policies allow 
Community Forest Reserves to be managed by Community 
Forest Management Group5, formed by any group of persons 
who are members of a village or who are living in or near to 
a forest, or any other groups of persons who are managing or 
desirous of managing a forest reserve (URT, 2002. s. 42 – 48. 
p.66, URT, 2007.p.7).
S2: In Malawi, Community Forest and Co-management 
policies define clearly that members of local institution must 
be elected and representative of the local forest organisation6 
(GoM, 1997. s.25. p. 15 and s 31, p. 16, GoM, 2010. p.47, 
GoM 2015, p. 11). The function and terminology used for a 
local forest organisation is determined by the land and tree 
tenure arrangements and the rights to forest resources in their 
area of operation (GoM, 2010. p.47). For example, members 
of the local forest organisation in village forest areas that is 
designated to benefit the entire village community, are elected 
and representatives of all resident in a village. In other forest 
areas, members in local forest organisations represent groups 
responsible for managing the forest area. In the case of com-
mon access resources, found in village forest areas designated 
for the benefit of that entire village community, the local 
organisation is normally termed as the Village Natural 
Resource Management Committee7 in Village forest area 
or block committee in Co-managed forest reserves (GoM, 
2010. p.47). 
S3: In Kenya, Participatory Forest Management policies 
state that the local institution in forest decentralization are 
Community Forest Associations Committee and members in 
the committee are elected to represent all groups within the 
Community Forest Association, but this association does not 
have to include all residents. Similarly, the composition of the 
Community Forest Association Committee is guided by the 
constitution of the association (GoK, 2005, p.3, GoK, 2007, 
p.25, GoK, 2014.p.16).
S4: In Uganda, forest decentralization policies state that 
local institutions in Collaborative Forest Management and 
Community Forest are the Communal Land Association 
Management Committee and Community Forest Manage-
ment Committee respectively. Members in these committees 
are not representatives all residents but only members of 
the Communal Land Association and Forest User groups in 
Collaborative Forest Management and Community Forest 
respectively (GoU, 2003. p.34, 52 and 53, GoU, 2015.p.6).
S5: In Ethiopia, forest decentralization policies specify 
that the local institution in Participatory Forest Management 
is the Forest Executive Committee, elected from a Forest 
Cooperative made of elders, youth, women, and different 
interest groups in the community (FDRE, 2007.s.4.4.p.11, 
FDRE, 2007.s.3.p.7, FDRE, 2012.p.2, 41 and 47).
Empowerment
Management capacity
S6: In Tanzania Village Land Forest Reserves and Joint Forest 
Management policies require members in Village Natural 
Resource Committees to be trained on how to hold meetings, 
undertaking patrols in the forest and dealing with offenders, 
issuing licenses and permits, keeping good records of money 
received, and spent by using a simple income and expenditure 
book (URT, 1998.PS.3 and 5, URT, 2002.s.16.p. 17. S.33.p.35, 
URT 2007, p.21, URT 2013, p.26). 
S7: Community Forest and Co management policies in 
Malawi require members in Village Natural Resource Man-
agement Committee and in Block committee respectively to 
be aware of tenure arrangements and usufruct rights issues 
prior to formal registration of Participatory Forest Manage-
ment so as to minimise resource use and land conflicts later 
following registration (GoM, 1997.s.31.p. 14, GoM, 2010. 
p.49).
S8: In Kenya Participatory Forest Management policies 
require members in the Community Forest Association 
1 “Local institutions” means actors at village levels elected by all resident at the community to guide the PFM approach.
2 “Village Natural Resource Committee” means a committee elected by the Village Assembly and approved by the Village Council to act as 
Manager of a VLFR (URT, 2013. p.5, and UTR, 2007. p. 7).
3 “Village council” means the government of the village elected by the Village Assembly to govern all matters relating to the community, in-
cluding its shared resources (URT, 2013. p.5 and URT, 2007. p. 7).
4 “Community” means all individuals who are resident in an area and not outsiders (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Precisely defining which indi-
viduals constitute the community is complex, however.
5 “Community Forest Management Group” means a group recognised by the Village Council and registered with the District Council that has 
the management authority for a Community Forest Reserve (UTR, 2007. p. 7).
6 “Local forest organisations” are groups of individuals, households, families or communities who have come together with a common interest 
of managing trees, forests and forest resources (GoM, 2010. p.47).
7 “Village Natural Resource Management Committee” means a committee elected by stakeholders of the village forest area (GoM, 2010. p.47).
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Committees to be trained in strategies for conflict resolution 
(GoK, 2014 p. 16, GoK, 2007. p. 31). In addition, the Partici-
patory Forest Management guidelines require the committee 
members to receive exchange visits and study tours from 
other Participatory Forest Management areas so as to enhance 
their management capacity (GoK, 2007. p.31).
S9: In Uganda forest policy and Community Forest 
guidelines require members in Communal Land Association 
Management Committees to be trained in skills of conflict 
management, Community Forest processes and legal / policy 
frameworks, Community Worker Model, community forest 
management and extension, dynamics of society, incentives, 
record-keeping, practical tree nursery and establishment 
(GoU, 2001. PS.5. p.18, GoU, 2015. p. 18). Likewise, in 
Uganda the policies require members in Community Forest 
Management Committee to be trained on legal basis for 
Collaborative Forest Management, leadership, communica-
tion and group facilitation skills, negotiation skills, planning, 
forest management, record keeping, accountability and 
simple conflicts resolution method (GoU, 2001. PS.5. p.18, 
GoU, 2003. p.35).
S10: In Ethiopia Participatory Forest Management poli-
cies require members in Forest Executive Committees to be 
trained on topics like forest development, forest protection, 
forest utilization, and marketing, conflict management, finan-
cial management, minutes and record keeping, developing 
and using monitoring formats (FDRE, 2007. s.5.p.11 and 
s.6.2.p.15; FDRE,2012. p.45, 48 and 49).
Decision making powers
S11: In Tanzania the Forest Act defines ownership rights to 
forest on public land and provide rights for local communities 
to own Village Land Forest Reserves in such a way that actors 
can make their own decision on their forests. (URT, 2002.s.33.
p.35). In addition, the policy empowers both committee and 
ordinary members with decision making over utilization of 
revenue from the sale of forest products obtained from Village 
Land Forest Reserves. In this case both committee and ordi-
nary members may choose to share a portion with the district 
in return for services rendered, the percentage to be shared 
with the district is set by the villagers and not the district 
(URT, 2007.p.4). Joint Forest Management and Community 
Forest Reserves policies require members in Village Natural 
Resource Committees and Community Forest Management 
Group to make decisions based on Joint Management Agree-
ment in strict accordance with the Management Plan (URT, 
2013, p.45. URT, 2007, p. 12). 
S12: In Malawi, Community Forest and Co management 
policies require Village Natural Resource Committee and 
Block Management Committee respectively, to consult 
Director of Forestry to any required decision out of the 
agreement. Likewise, the Forest Act allow Village Natural 
Resource Committee to terminate management agreement 
subject to the performance of unfulfilled obligations under 
a forest management agreement to the right of third parties 
(GoM, 1997.s.31.p. 14). Community Forest guidelines 
require Village Natural Resource Committees to make 
decisions independently when developing the constitution. 
The Community Forest guidelines specify that the process of 
developing a constitution may be facilitated but not unduly 
guided by the forestry extension service (GoM, 2010. p. 49).
S13: participatory Forest Management policies in Kenya 
state that a Community Forest Associations Committee can 
make decisions on only activities specified in Management 
Agreement. Likewise, any activity within a forest area, which 
is not included in the management plan or agreement, shall 
only be undertaken with the consent of the Board (GoK, 2007. 
p.31, GoK, 2005. s.46.p.41). Likewise, Forest Act grants 
power for a Director to terminate a management agreement 
with Community Forest Associations or withdraw a particular 
user right but Community Forest Associations had no power 
to terminate management agreements, they need to request to 
the Director for termination (GoK, 2005. s.48. p. 41). 
S14: In Uganda Community Forest and Collaborative 
Forest Management policies states that any decision required 
needs to be made through negotiations between agreement 
parties (GoU, 2001. PS.5. p.18, GoU, 2003. p.26, GoU, 2015. 
p.35).
S15: In Ethiopia Participatory Forest Management guide-
lines state that any decision required in Forest management 
which is outside the legally binding agreement needs to be 
agreed between government forestry service and the Forest 
Cooperative (FDRE, 2012. p.45).
Utilization rights
S16: Village Land Forest Reserves and Community Forest 
Reserve policies in Tanzania empower Village Natural 
Resource Committees and ordinary members Village Land 
Forest Reserves; Community Forest Management Group in 
Community Forest Reserve, with utilization rights. E.g. i). 
Waiving state royalties on forest produce, retaining 100% of 
revenue from sale of forest products ii). Levying and retaining 
fine, exemption from the reserved tree species list and confis-
cation of forest produce and equipment from illegal harvest-
ing (URT, 2002.s.14.p 22; s. 34.p. 36 s. 65. p.68. s.78. p.74. 
s 97.p. 82, URT, 2007.p.4).
S17: Malawian Community Forest guidelines in particular 
specify that in Village Forest Areas, the VNRMC and the 
community have the right to retain 100% of the benefits and 
should share and use according to the constitution (GoM, 
2010.p.78). However, the Forest Act and Co management 
guidelines require Block Management Committee and 
ordinary members to utilise only 70% of any funds obtained 
from the approach (GoM, 1997.s.33.p. 15, GoM, 2010.p.78). 
In addition, the Forest Act states that a resident of any village 
may collect forest produce from customary land other than 
village forest areas for domestic use (GoM, 1997.s. 50. p. 18). 
S18: In Kenya the Forest Policy in particular states that the 
Government will develop an institutional framework and 
mechanisms for effective participation of stakeholders in for-
est management (GoK, 2014 p. 16). Furthermore, the Forest 
Act and guidelines specify that utilization rights of members 
of Community Forest Associations will be limited to those 
outlined on the forest management agreement (GoK, 2005.
s. 46. p. 40, GoK, 2007. p. 31).
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S19: In Uganda Community Forest policies, granted 
members of Communal Land Associations with rights to 
access all the benefits obtained from the programme. While 
in Collaborative Forest Management actors have limited 
utilization rights, all rights and benefits of the Forest User 
Groups must be determined during the negotiation of 
Collaborative Forest Management Agreement between the 
Responsible Body and elected negotiation team and not the 
forest management committee (GoU, 2003. p.33). 
S20: In Ethiopia Participatory Forest Management guide-
lines require benefit and revenue sharing arrangements to be 
defined clearly and agreed between the Forest Cooperative 
and Government Forestry service during the negotiation 
process (FDRE, 2012. p. 37). The Participatory Forest Man-
agement guidelines and forest policy specify that in principle 
the benefit sharing arrangement should reflect the responsi-
bility of each agreeing party. It must be clarified from the 
start that benefits are tied to the level of responsibility one 
undertakes (FDRE, 2007, s.5. p. 12, FDRE, 2012. p. 37). 
Enforcement powers
S21: In Tanzania, Village Land Forest Reserves and Joint For-
est Management policies specify that the village must prepare 
by-laws that support the management plan (fines, sanctions, 
etc.) and these by- laws must be approved first by the village 
assembly before being forwarded to the district for final 
approval (URT, 2002. s. 34.p. 36. s.37.p.40, URT, 2007.p. 5, 
URT, 2013.p. 22). Likewise, the Forest Act specifies that the 
Director of Forests may prepare and publish model by-laws 
for the forest reserves and such by-laws may be adopted by 
village councils for use (URT, 2002. s. 34.p. 36. s.37.p.40). In 
addition, the Village Land Forest Reserves and Joint Forest 
Management guidelines require the Village Council to make 
sure that the local Primary and District Magistrates have 
copies of the by-laws to use if any cases relating to the matter 
are brought before them. Likewise, the Village Council keeps 
one copy in its file and also posts one copy at the Office 
so that everyone in the village can see it (URT, 2007.p.20, 
URT, 2013.p.25). The guidelines also require Village Natural 
Resource Committees to ensure that every village member 
knows the forest rules and punishments, likewise Village Nat-
ural Resource Committees need to provide a list of the rules 
and punishments to Village Councils of neighbouring villages 
to inform their own people (URT, 2013.p. 26; URT, 2007. 
p. 21). In addition, the Joint Forest Management guidelines 
states that forester needs to assist Village Natural Resource 
Committees in Joint Forest Management to some cases of 
large scale illegal activities. (URT, 2013.p.26).
S22: In Malawi Community Forest and Co-management 
policies specify that the Forest Minister may make rules 
which shall apply to all customary land outside forest reserves 
and protected forest areas (GoM, 1997. s. 32. p. 16). Like-
wise, all forest rules made by Village Natural Resource 
Management Committees on customary land forests shall 
be approved by the Minister (GoM, 1997.s.33. p. 15). In 
addition, Community Forest guidelines require Village 
Natural Resource Management Committee to develop, and 
the local community to ratify, constitutions that set down 
clearly objectives and functions and the way in which actors 
will conduct forest management affairs. The constitution 
includes procedural rules, or by-laws, which are quite distinct 
from the management rules developed from a forest manage-
ment plan for the regulation of forestry activities within the 
Village Forest Area (GoM, 2010. p. 49).
S23: In Kenya, Participatory Forest Management policies 
specify that the Community Forest Association’s Committee 
and ordinary members have no power to make forest rules, 
however the Director may make rules for regulating the 
performance of PFM in consultation with the association 
(GoK, 2005. s.46. p.41, GoK, 2007. p. 28).
S24: The Forest Act in Uganda requires Collaborative 
Forest Management to be managed accordance with the 
regulations or guidelines issued by the Forest Minister (GoU, 
2003. s.15. p.13). Likewise, the Forest Act states that local 
governments may make by-laws applicable to any community 
forest (GoU, 2005. s.19.p.15). Community Forest and Col-
laborative Forest Management policies in Uganda require 
Community Forest Management Committees and Communal 
Land Association Management Committees respectively, to 
prepare the constitution but not to approve it. The constitution 
must be approved by the District Registrar of Titles in 
Community Forest and Local Government in Collaborative 
Forest Management (GoU, 2015.p.17, GoU, 2003. p. 31).
S25: In Ethiopia Participatory Forest Management guide-
lines state that cooperative by-laws for forest management are 
prepared by members of the forest executive committee with 
assistance from the Government forest service and are first 
endorsed by a general assembly meeting (FDRE 2007. s.4.4. 
p.11 and s.5.5.p. 14, FDRE, 2012.p. 53). However, the 
Participatory Forest Management guidelines specify that the 
Participatory Forest Management plan cannot be implement-
ed without a formal agreement and final approval of the gov-
ernment (FDRE, 2012, p.54). Likewise, the PFM guidelines 
require prosecutors, the police and the judiciary to support 
community and be concerned with the damages caused by 
offenders on Forests (FDRE, 2012. p. 51).
Accountability
S26: Village Land Forest Reserves and Joint Forest Manage-
ment policies in Tanzania state that Village Natural Resource 
Committees need to be upwardly accountable to district coun-
cils and downwardly accountable to village councils and to 
the village assembly (URT, 2007.p. 21, URT, 2002, s. 33.p.35 
and URT, 2013.p.26). Moreover, the Village Land Forest 
Reserves and JFM guidelines specified that facilitators will 
need to assist Village Natural Resource Committees in keep-
ing records and submitting them to district, village council 
and village assembly on a regular basis (URT, 2007.p. 21, 
URT, 2013.p.26). Village Land Forest Reserves and JFM 
policies in Tanzania state that members in Village Natural 
Resource Committees should be elected by all village mem-
bers through the village general assembly, to represent the 
entire village community i.e. formed from the membership of 
the village assembly and with due regard to gender balance 
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(URT, 2002, s.33.p.52, URT, 2007, p.5, URT, 2013, p.4). 
(Table 3). In addition, the Forest Policy also allow participa-
tion of different stakeholders in forest management e.g. 
executive agencies and private sector (URT, 1998.PS 6.p.31).
S27: Malawian Community Forest and Co management 
policies in particular specify clearly that members in Village 
Natural Resources Management Committees and Block 
Committees respectively will be held accountable to their 
memberships, the local forest resource rights-holders or the 
community it represents according to tree and land tenure, but 
also to the Director of Forestry for the proper management 
of forest resources within its jurisdiction (GoM, 2010. p.48). 
Moreover, the Community Forest and Co management guide-
lines state that it is critical that the members in Village Natural 
Resource Management Committees or Block Committees be 
held accountable to the wider community or the rights holders 
on a regular basis reporting forest management progress. 
In addition, elections of members in the Village Natural 
Resources Management Committees or Block Committee 
will be held at least twice a year (GoM, 2010.p.49). (Table 3). 
Likewise, the Community Forest policies define clearly 
that members in Village Natural Resource Management 
Committees must be elected by all members of local forest 
organisation (GoM, 2010. p.47). 
S28: Participatory Forest Management policies in Kenya 
require Forest Community Association Committees to be 
upwardly accountable to the Director8 or Service9 and down-
wardly accountable to all residents in the area whether they 
are members of the Association or not. However, the Partici-
patory Forest Management guidelines specify that actors will 
be accountable in more detail to Forest Community Associa-
tion members than non-Association members (GoK, 2007, 
p. 31, GoK 2005, s.45.p 39). Likewise, Participatory Forest 
Management policies specify that members in Forest Com-
munity Association Committee be elected by only members 
of the Forest Community Association (GoK, 2005, p.38, 
GoK, 2007, p.25). The Participatory Forest Management 
policies in Kenya also encourage participation of different 
stakeholders e.g. private sector, civil society and other non-
state actors in all levels in forest sector planning implementa-
tion and decision making (GoK, 2014.p.16).
S29: In Uganda, Community Forest Management 
Committees in Collaborative Forest Management need to be 
downwardly accountable to the Forest User Group which they 
represent and upwardly accountable to the Responsible body10 
(GoU, 2003.p. 42). Nevertheless, Community Forest policies 
remain silent on to whom local institutions are required to be 
accountable. In addition, Community Forest and Collabora-
tive Forest policies specify that members of the Community 
Forest Management Committee and Communal Land Asso-
ciation Management Committee are elected only by members 
of Forest User Groups and Communal Land Association 
respectively (GoU, 2003. p.34, 52 &53, GoU, 2015.p.6). 
(Table 3). In addition, the Forest policy requires harmonisa-
tion of approaches and legislation relating to collaborative 
forest management between lead government agencies, and 
with NGOs/CBOs (GoU, 2001.PS.5.p.18).
S30: Ethiopia’s Forest Proclamation is silent and PFM 
guidelines are unclear on to whom forest executive commit-
tees should be accountable. However, the guidelines state that 
the established community institution needs to be account-
able, because it will be dealing with environmental, social 
and financial management issues which have individual and 
collective interest (FDRE, 2012. p.42). Participatory Forest 
Management policies lack clarity on who is responsible 
for electing members of forest executive committee. Partici-
patory Forest Management policies in Ethiopia also allow 
participation of NGOs in supporting Participatory Forest 
Management (FDRE, 2007, s.4.3 and 4.4. p. 11. s.5.3.p.13, 
FDRE, 2012. p.4).
8 “Director” means the person appointed as director of Kenya Forest Service pursuant to section 10 of forest act (GoK, 2005.p.5).
9 “Service” means the Kenya Forest Service established under section 4 of forest act (GoK, 2005.p.8).
10 “Responsible body “means a body designated to manage, maintain and control a forest reserve or a community forest under the Forestry Act 
and in the case of private forest, the owner or person in charge of the forest (GoU, 2003.p.53).
